This is far and away the longest article Mr Blundell has ever republished.
I extend my public thanks to American Journal
This public announcement display presentation would be for readers who have heard me speak this morning in the Adelaide Hills on the psycho-spiritual death of undergraduate Public Square^ chatter concerning the ghastly ‘gladiatorial’ 500 years to 2008 contest of pluralism and collectivism a useful jumping back point in patriarchic studies.
Have I myself read it, no. The first line in the ‘blurb’ or promotional schpiel named Oliver Wendell Homes one of the ‘Second’ or New-world’s grand and eloquent jurists. That did me.
John
Thematics logic, neurocognitive health, internet reform, economy, education, have-a-good-day

Winter 2025 / Volume IX, Number 4
The Making of a Techno-Nationalist Elite
By Tanner Greer
REVIEW ESSAY
The Technological Republic:
Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West
Alexander Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska
Crown Currency, 2025, 320 pages
America has gifted mankind two great patrimonies. The first is a familiar set of institutions and ideals. These are crystallized in our civic catechism, captured in certain phrases: โWe hold these truths to be self-evident,โ or โgovernment of the people, by the people, for the people.โ The institutions (constitutions, legislatures, courts, and so forth) that realize these ideals have had immense global influence.
Democracy, despite the challenge posed by alternative systems, remains the global default. This would not be true if Americans had not first proven that democratic governments could endure. We were the first people to gamble the fate of our nation on Enlightenment ideals and the first to demonstrate that those ideals could serve as the foundation for a stable political order. Two centuries on, American poets and politicians still celebrate this improbable achievement.
Americans are less proud of their second gift to the species. Yet on the civilizational scale, this second contribution may be more consequential than the first. It was the American people who first leapt from the agrarian age to industrial modernity, a revolution whose importance is only rivaled by the invention of agriculture itself. This revolution replaced mules with machinery, lamps with electricity, and bricks and wood with concrete and steel. Humanity would henceforth live in a world of wires, engines, and endless acceleration. This world had no precedent in human experience. It was a world built by the United States of America.1
The scene was prepared by the British, whose inventors harnessed steam power during the First Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But the inventions that make modern life possible emerged between 1860 and 1930.2 These years saw the invention and diffusion of steam turbines, internal combustion engines, electric motors, alternators, transformers and rectifiers, incandescent light, electromagnetic waves, recorded sound, aluminum smelting, dephosphorized steel and steel alloys, reinforced concrete, nitroglycerin, synthesized ammonia, radio transmission, plastics, and gas turbines. The architecture of our industrial civilization was assembled within one lifespan.
Americans did this assembling. The science that underpinned these technologies was international, but these technologies were refined, commercialized, and scaled in the United States. The Second Industrial Revolution unfolded as American industrialists built the corporate and financial machinery needed for industrial-scale production. Out of this crucible came not only new machines but new forms of management, bureaucracy, and social organization that, over the course of a century, would be imitated, adapted, and imposed across nearly every society on Earth. The United States was the birthplace of the technological republic.
By naming their new book The Technological Republic, Palantir executives Alexander Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska gesture toward this heritage. The book comes at a unique juncture in Silicon Valleyโs history. Its leaders have awoken to their status as a distinct social elite but remain uncertain as to what obligations that status carries. Their old โCalifornian Ideology,โ half libertarian fantasy and half globalist prophecy, has collapsed. What creed will take its place is not clear.3 Few seem better placed to address these questions than Karp, a founder known as much for intellectual ambition as for entrepreneurial success. While leading a defense tech company, with close ties to the sitting administration, he and Zamiska are perfectly positioned to lay out a new civic philosophy for Americaโs technological elite.
Readers hoping for such a book, however, will be disappointed. The Technological Republic is not a serious exploration of the political foundations of technology, nor a study of the technological foundations of American power. It is not a sober forecast of technological trends or a reckoning with their implications for the American public. It is not even a business history of Palantir itself. The Technological Republic aims at something โsubstantial and ambitious,โ inhabiting โthe interstitial but we hope rich space between political, business, and academic treatises.โ4 It reads like a collection of TED Talks. Its chapters are discrete and disconnected. The themes that tie them together are nowhere explicitly laid out but must be inferred by the reader.
The most persistent of these themes is a critique of Silicon Valleyโs โengineering elite.โ Karp and Zamiska insist that the fortunes and fame of this elite were not created ex nihilo. This class is, in fact, deeply indebted to the civilization that made their firms possible, one that most of them feel no kinship with or obligation to. At the center of that civilization is the United States. The American nation should demand the loyalty of those who prosper most from it. This loyalty should be freely given. Karp and Zamiska believe that tech leaders should focus their substantial talents on bettering this nation. Like Palantir, their firms should not shy away from the provision of public goods. Silicon Valley should boldly take part in the โarticulation of the national project.โ5 Alas, the instinct of the Silicon Valley founder is to move as the market lists. How does the market list? Toward โlifestyle technologiesโ whose main purpose is to โenable the highly educated . . . to feel as if they have more income than they do.โ Americaโs engineering elite is brilliant, but their brilliance is wasted on baubles.6
These observations may be accurate, but the goal of The Technological Republic is to inspire American technologists to become American techno-nationalists. Regrettably, Karp and Zamiska offer no roadmap for accomplishing this. The two men invoke the technologists of generaยญtions past as archetypes the modern engineering elite might aspire to, but they do not investigate the religious, social, political, or economic milieu that created these technologists. This is unfortunate: Karp and Zamiskaโs sermonizing is not sufficient to make patriots out of a generation of engineers who have never been trained to think of themselves as stewards of a state. Elevating Silicon Valleyโs engineering elite into a governing class would require much more: institutions, alliances, and traditions that root the wealth and expertise of our technologists in service to the nation.
The United States has had such a class in the past. They were the architects of the Second Industrial Revolution: engineers, industrialists, and entrepreneurs who believed that a technological revolution was needed to propel America toward greatness. They were, in this sense, Americaโs first governing class of techno-nationalists. In the mid-twentieth century, Americans would label their descendants the โEastern Establishment.โ This class did not materialize out of thin air. Examining their origins, and the reasons for their seventy-year dominance of American business and government, provides a useful corrective to Karp and Zamiskaโs fragmented thinking and hazy wishcasting.
The Genesis of Americaโs First Techno-Nationalist Elite
The techno-nationalist sees technology and nationhood as two intertwined goods. As technology advances, so does national power. Only a powerful state can unite a populous nation around a common identity and protect it from both external enemies and centrifugal forces. Such a nation then functions as a vast open market that allows emerging industries to benefit fully from economies of scale. These industries create wealth; wealth invested expands industrial capacity; booming industrial development stimulates the invention and adoption of new technologies, beginning the cycle anew.
This vision of techno-nationalist development has a long American pedigree. Alexander Hamilton described its essential elements more than two centuries ago. Hamilton predicted that American independence would last only if the thirteen American states fused their economies into one national market governed by an energetic executive. This government would spur industry, uphold American credit, and deter foreign predation. This was an explicitly industrial vision. He believed that โnot only the wealth but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of [its] manufactures.โ Industrial development, in turn, required the security and scale that could only come from a large and unified nation. Hamilton argued that the U.S. Constitution would create this nation. By โbind[ing] together [our states] in a strict and indissoluble Union,โ the constitution would โerect one great American system . . . able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world.โ7
The Hamiltonian program for โone great American systemโ of growing integration, advancing industry, and rising power was not realized in Hamiltonโs lifetime. While the U.S. Constitution laid the groundwork for a technological republic, it was not enough to bring one into being. What the new republic required was a national elite resolutely committed to their nationโs technological ascent. But it would take decades before a class with such techno-nationalist inclinations came to helm the American state and economy.
There were several reasons for this. Antebellum elites thought of themselves as the first men of their states, not as the first men of the Union.8 Most came of age in an era when communication between regions was slow and halting. A letter from New Orleans to New York, cruising the countryโs waterways, could take a month to arrive.9 In such a world, elite social networks were centered in their local communities. The leading patriarchs of Philadelphia, New York, Charleston, Baltimore, and Boston did not marry beyond state lines.10 Elite universities were anchored just as firmly in their regions. For instance, more than 70 percent of Harvard students were born in New England well into the 1870s.11
Commerce lacked the weight, and industry the reach, to forge a constituency for national integration. Most antebellum corporations were chartered by individual states and were required to ply their trade within state lines.12 The defeat of the Second Bank of the United States in 1832 left the country a fractured financial mosaic, its credit system a patchwork quilt of competing state-based institutions. Even with the advent of the railroads, uninterrupted transportation for more than a hundred miles was rarely possible. Most antebellum railroads were locally built and used completely different gauges. The system was fragmented between hundreds of competing lines. By 1860, no more than half a dozen crossed state borders.13
Geographic distance was compounded by cultural rifts. The United States was founded by a variety of settler cultures, each with distinct views on virtue, freedom, and honor.14 These cultural cleavages persisted into the nineteenth century, sparking tensions wherever pioneers from different backgrounds settled in close proximity.15 The Congregationalism of the old Boston Brahmins contrasted sharply with the Anglicanism of the Tidewater aristocrats and Philadelphia merchants; both were distinct from the Methodist and Presbyterian creeds which dominated the Midwest and the Scots-Irish backcountry.16 Orators played up these differences and often framed political debates as battles between culturally and economically distinct regions, such as โthe North,โ โthe West,โ and โthe South.โ17 In this environment, Washington was, like Brussels today, less the seat of a cohesive governing elite than a forum where representatives of competing polities met to hammer out deals.18
The most significant fissure split the slaveholding South from the rest of the republic. For decades, influential southerners were dogged enemies of national integration, fearing it might erode the stability of their โdomestic institution.โ19 These forces controlled the balance of American power. Eight of Americaโs first fifteen presidents hailed from the South; in twenty-four of the thirty-two years that preceded the Civil War, the presidency was controlled by the Democrats, whose party was dominated by southerners. The strength of the slave power not only reinforced the localist, antinationalist thrust of American politics, it also fueled fierce resistance to any national program of technological development. Southern elite life revolved around counties, not cities; agriculture, not industry; and the export of raw materials, not the import of foreign capital. The Democratic press thus attacked proposals for industrial development with special venom.
A Hamiltonian economic program, declared Argus of Western America, โruns the whole round of the British devices to enslave a people.โ The Southern Review told its readers that โours is an agricultural people, and God grant that we may continue so. It is the freest, happiest, most independent, and with us, the most powerful condition on earth.โ The Democratic Review was more venomous, calling it โalmost a crime against society to divert human industry from the fields and forests to iron forges and cotton factories.โ A Georgia newspaper was even more scathing: โFree Society! we sicken at the name. . . . The prevailing class one meets with [in the North] is that of mechanics struggling to be genteel . . . [but] who are hardly fit for association with a Southern gentlemanโs body servant.โ20
The fortunes of the wealthiest Northern families were yoked to the slave power; their politics often echoed its priorities. New Yorkโs merchant houses served as financial brokers for the cotton magnates and their British customers. They had as much disdain for โmechanics struggling to be genteelโ as the Southerners; their dealings and their wealth were oriented toward the Atlantic, not the American interior.21 The other great bloc of Northern wealth, the tight-knit dynasties who raised the textile mills of Lowell and Lawrence, confined their investments to New England. Their mills hummed only so long as the Southern plantations fed them raw fiber. The coalition they formed with Southern planters (what Charles Sumner would scornfully call โthe lords of loom and the lords of the lashโ) further magnified Southern political power.22
The wealthiest elite groups of the antebellum era thus resembled Karpโs picture of the contemporary tech elite: they were suspicious of executive power, distrustful of American nationalism, insulated from the American public, and focused their investments in whatever field promised the highest returns, regardless of the political consequences for doing so. Many were localists; some were Atlanticists. Almost none were nationalists. Their favored politicians, men like Franklin Pierce, William Marcy, Howell Cobb, and James Henry Hammond, dismantled Americaโs system of centralized finance, slashed its tariffs, vetoed internal improvements, shoved industrial policy down to the states, and maligned the rising class of industrialists.
Americaโs most powerful regional elites simply had no material stake in a technological republic, and they lacked the nation-spanning institutions or social networks needed to lead one. The handful of antebellum statesmen who, with Daniel Webster, urged Americans to become โone people, one in interest, one in character, and one in political feeling,โ were rewarded with a lifetime of political disappointments.23 All of this would change with the Civil War.
The conflict elevated two social groups that had hitherto played second fiddle on the American stage: the disparate Northern regional elites, newly united beneath the Republican banner, and the rising class of industrialists and their financiers.24 The first seized the commanding heights of the Unionโs politics; the second built the commanding heights of its economy. War bound them together in a common techno-nationalist project. The personal ties, institutions, and ideology that saved the Union would continue long after the guns went silent at Appomattox.
The ascent of this new elite class was hastened by the eclipse of its old rivals. With a few Maryland grandees excepted, the great planter aristocracyโferociously hostile to both industry and the Unionโfollowed their states in secession. Before their rebellion was over, the economic and political foundations of their power lay in ruins. Their ports were blockaded; their fields were stripped bare by marauding armies; their traditional customers found other sources of cotton; and emancipation, in a stroke, erased the largest store of Southern wealth.25 During Reconstruction, the plantation class was denied formal political power; after Reconstruction, they were only a junior coalition partner in the weaker national party. It would be a full century until any representative of a secessionist state would be elected president.
The Republicans of the 36th Congress moved quickly to exploit the absence of Southern obstruction. They advanced a legislative program which has since been called โthe blueprint for modern America.โ26 The package included vast land grants to transcontinental railroads, high tariffs to stimulate domestic manufacturing, and a host of measures designed to spur national development. As the Civil War stretched on, demand for iron, rail lines, machine tools, telegraph wires, steam engines, and armaments surged. The combination of new protective tariffs and the threat of Confederate commerce raiding ensured that domestic producers met this demand. For enterprising industrialists, this was an extraordinary opportunity to amass wealth on a scale that antebellum America had never offered.27
War also birthed a new kind of American financier. At the outset of hostilities, Washington lacked both the taxation machinery to fund its armies and the appetite to inflate away the nationโs currency. Instead, it turned to a rising class of bankers who marketed bonds in Philadelphia, Boston, and, above all, New York. These financiers, in turn, closely advised the federal government on how to design a national banking system capable of supplying the Union with a universal currency and a uniform system of credit.28 Young upstart J. P. Morgan began his ascent serving as one of these financial intermediaries.29 He was not alone in this. Out of the ten largest banks in New York City in 1870, five did not exist before the war.30
To a striking degree, the war effort was sustained through the voluntary efforts of the Unionโs most prominent citizens. Some of these contributions, such as John D. Rockefellerโs sponsorship of thirty Cleveland soldiers, were individual.31 Others required association. Across the Northโs largest cities, prominent citizens organized Union League Clubs, which functioned both as social clubs for nationalist elites and as political action committees for the Union cause. Through the course of the war, the members of the Philadelphia Union League Club would outfit โnine regiments, two battalions, and a troop of cavalry.โ32 Its New York counterpart would print 900,000 Unionist pamphlets and would put New Yorkโs first black regiment into the field.33
More impressive still were the efforts of the New York City Union Defense Committee, organized days after the first shots at Fort Sumter; it rushed workers to fix sabotaged rail lines, aided the families of poor conscripted soldiers, and raised a total of sixty regiments.34 The Sanitary Commission, a volunteer aid society led by the same upper-class northeastern elites that flocked to the Union League clubs, mobilized and trained thousands of nurses to tend to the Northโs wounded and sick. A similarly organized Christian Commission provided religious literature and services to soldiers and sailors on every front of the war.35
The men who joined this effort drew from it a new national consciousness. โWhat I learned from the Civil War,โ recalled Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who served as a regimental officer in the Army of the Potomac, โwas that Boston is just one city in America.โ36 It was a lesson learned by many young Boston Brahmins on the frontlines. Of each class that graduated from Harvard between 1855 and 1861, between a third and a half went to war.37 They were thrown into a great melting pot of young northeastern patricians. Of 120 Union staff officers who were not West Point graduates, ninety-three were natives of the New England states, New York, and Pennsylvania; of 134 cavalry officers, seventy-three were natives of the Northeast.38 There, working in close contact with commanding officers who had earlier worked with the regional railroads, these young men would gain firsthand experience with the industrial methods of organization, logistics, and accounting that powered the Union war machine. And they would not forget these skills when they returned to civilian life. As historian George Fredrickson observed, the war transformed them โfrom a demoralized gentry without a clearly defined social role [in national life] into a self-confident modernizing elite.โ39
This would shock and disconcert their fathers and grandfathers; most were still devoted to the romantic individualism that had dominated American culture during their own youth.40 The Civil War thus marked a decisive generational turning point. Most Union generals were in their thirties or forties when they assumed command; their junior officers were younger still. Nor was the Unionโs civilian leadership dominated by elder graybeards. In William H. Sewardโs words, at the dawn of the Civil War, the Republican Party was โchiefly a party of young men.โ41 Wall Street saw it the same way. One prominent financier later recalled that the struggle to mobilize finance occurred just after the panic of 1857, during which the โold conservative element [of Wall Street] had fallen . . . and its place supplied by better material and with young blood.โ42 The Civil War both elevated a new generation of elites into public life and served as the crucible that defined their worldview; they would carry this worldview with them through the rest of their public careers, which often stretched well into the twentieth century.
Few understood the significance of these developments better than Frederick Law Olmsted, a pivotal figure in New York politics who founded the cityโs Union League Club and served as the first secretary of the Sanitary Commission. Reflecting on the Clubโs mission, Olmsted compared its members with rebel plantation masters, who fought to protect a โlegally privileged classโ modeled on European nobility. In contrast, the Union League Clubs represented a โtrue American aristocracy.โ This democratic gentry would be composed partly of โmen of substance and established high position socially . . . men of good stock, or of notably high character . . . and especially those of old colonial names well brought down.โ But it must also draw in โpromising young menโquite young men, who should be sought for and drawn in and nursed and nourished with care, but especially of those rich young men . . . who donโt understand what their place can be in American society.โ43
The rebellion had shown these young men what that place might be.44 Republican politicians, army officers, industrialists, and financiers had been thrown together by common cause. In the sweat and strain of wartime administration, these young men worked shoulder to shoulder. They met in committee rooms and counting houses, in field headquarters and Union League clubs. In the process, they formed bonds of trust that endured long after the Civil Warโs close.
In war, they had saved the Union. Now, they would build its strength in peace. Their task was to stitch the continent into a single market, to tie its farms and cities together with railroads and telegraphs, and to develop new American industries, thereby empowering the American people on the world stage. They would be the architects of a new, continent-spanning technological republic. Such an ethos would sustain Americaโs new elite through the Gilded Age.
Consolidation of a Techno-Nationalist Elite
The partnership between Northern industrialists and political leaders only deepened in the postbellum years. Both groups โembraced continental integration as a heroic undertaking and infused it with an exhilarating sense of grandiosity.โ45 Their solidarity was expressed in political alliances, reinforced by common schools and civic clubs, and deepened through widespread intermarriage. By the end of the Gilded Age, it no longer made sense to speak of them as two separate camps. They had fused into one governing stratum: the โEastern Establishment.โ
Consider the composition of Theodore Rooseveltโs cabinet. Before he served as Rooseveltโs postmaster general or the chairman of the Republican National Committee, Henry Clay Pyne worked as both an electricity and railway executive. He was not the only railway or electricity executive in the cabinet: Rooseveltโs vice president, his first secretary of the interior, and two of his Navy secretaries had been railway men, while his first secretary of commerce and second postmaster general both served as the presidents of electric utilities.
The cabinet also included several accomplished industrial lawyers, among them Victor Metcalf, Elihu Root, and Philander Knox, who began his career representing Andrew Carnegie. Before he led the State Department, Robert Bacon managed J. P. Morganโs steel and railroad interests; Lyman Gage, in contrast, would leave the administration to serve as the president of U.S. Trust. Even the literary-minded John Hay, who never held a corporate job in his life, was thoroughly enmeshed in the world of industry by way of marriage: his wife was Clara Stone, daughter of Ohio railroad mogul Amasa Stone. During the Second Industrial Revolution, the families that governed the United States and the families that captained its industries were one and the same.
This was Americaโs first techno-nationalist elite class. Their nation-building program, and the fortunes that sustained it, demanded coorยญdinated action across economic, political, social, and cultural fronts.
In the years following the Civil War, the vast financial machinery built to market war bonds now opened its coffers to the railroads, telegraph companies, and manufacturing. The scale of expansion was extraordinary. In the seven years after the Civil War, the number of American factories doubled. By 1873, $400 million dollars had been invested in manufacturing capital, four times the amount invested in 1865. It only took four years for the railroads to gather $500 million dollars in new investment. To handle this boom in financial activity, the number of bankers in New York City grew from 167 in the year 1864 to 1,800 in 1870. The railroad companies they invested in would lay thirty-five thousand miles of track over those same years, which amounted to more track than existed in the entire railroad network of 1860.46 That was only the beginning: by 1895, railroad capitalization was fourteen times the national debt, and four times all local, state, and federal debt combined. At that point, 183,601 miles of rail line had been laid, approximately 42 percent of the global total.47
The sheer volume of physical material that could now be produced, transported, and processed by these new technologies had no precedent in human history.48 Existing corporate forms could not manage the torrent. The railroads, which had to coordinate hundreds of trains moving across multiple states and time zones on a finite number of lines, were the first to confront the problem head-on. Their solution was to invent the modern corporation: vast, vertically integrated bureaucracies with multi-level, managerial hierarchies. These structures shifted deciยญsion-making power away from the decentralized marketplace and into the hands of salaried technicians and middle managers, creating a template that would define American businessโand American powerโfor the next century.49
Corporate hierarchies gave businessmen, a profession created by this technological revolution, the tools to master scale. But scale alone did not guarantee profit. As technology proliferated, so did competition. Cutting-edge industries required enormous capital outlays, yet ruthless price wars drove returns downward. In this environment, financiers found it difficult to justify further investment in technological development. Once again, an organizational answer was found. Under the prodding of financiers like J. P. Morgan, firms first formed cartels or โpools,โ then coalesced into trusts, and at last fused into horizontally integrated holding companies.50 Consolidations would reach a fever pitch in the years between 1897 and 1904, as 4,277 industrial firms were merged into just 257.51
Americaโs technological revolution could not have been possible without a corresponding revolution in legal doctrine. Before the Civil War, corporations were generally quasi-public bodies chartered indiยญvidually by state legislatures to accomplish public aims. Their activities were confined to narrow public purposes, with their capitalization, geographic scope, and permissible lines of business limited by their charters.52 National industrial systems were not possible within this framework. The Second Industrial Revolution was premised on a legal architecture designed and defended by the Eastern Establishmentโs jurists and legislators.
This great reformation began with a salvo of new laws across northeastern states that replaced incorporation through legislation with a standardized system of procedural filing. New legal statues provided directors and shareholders with nearly unlimited power to amend articles of incorporation, modify the character of their business, and modify the rights of classes of their shares. Northeastern states also relaxed restrictions on internal business operations, liberalizing the definitions of capital, surplus, and profits to enable complex corporate accounting practices, removing requirements to receive state permission to operate outside of the state, allowing corporations to hold stock in foreign state companies, and loosening merger requirements. This process went furthest in New Jersey, whose state legislature undermined trust-busting efforts by passing a general incorporation law for consolidated holding companies just before the federal Sherman Antitrust Act went into force.53
The courts strengthened the new corporationsโ legal standing in a series of groundbreaking cases. Wabash v. Illinois (1886) barred states from regulating interstate commerce, leaving corporations largely free to operate across state borders. Reflecting back on the case at the dawn of the twentieth century, one legal analyst described its consequence: โin the last 30 years [the Commerce Clause of the constitution] has been so developed that it is now in its nationalizing tendency perhaps the most important conspicuous power possessed by the federal government.โ54 Just as important may have been Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroadโs (1886) formulation that corporations were constitutional โpersonsโ entitled to due process and equal protection. When coupled with Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway v. Minnesota (1890) and Allegeyer vs. Louisianaโs (1896) substantive due process doctrines that barred rate regulation absent โjust compensationโ and prevented state governments from breaching โliberty of contract,โ this doctrine โrendered many efforts to regulate economic activity impossible.โ55
The effect of these decisions was to create a large, unified national market unencumbered by state regulation, one which accelerated โthe centralization of power in the Federal Government, the obliteration of State lines, and the degradation of the State judiciary,โ56 as one contemporary opponent of the federal courts described it.
Justices in this era would occasionally cite the benefits of an integrated national market explicitly in these decisions.57 But their belief in the importance of integrated national systems was most visible in their treatment of corporate receivership. Before the 1880s, insolvent railroads were typically broken up and their assets liquidated for the benefit of bondholders. But as the scale of the major interstate railroads grew, railroad managers began petitioning federal courts for receivership even before default, hoping to ward off dismemberment. Judges obliged. Beginning in the 1880s, federal judges began to protect managers by appointing them as receivers of their own companies, subordinating creditor rights to the larger imperative of maintaining a nationally integrated system of rail lines.
The overleveraged industry embraced the new arrangement: twelve of the nationโs twenty-eight largest railroad systemsโfirms that owned one-third of all American railroad mileageโentered โfriendlyโ receivership. This allowed them to write off terrific amounts of debt: of the sixty-eight companies so reorganized between 1885 and 1900, the average firm slashed its fixed charges by 34 percent as it passed through receivership!58 In the words of legal scholar E. Merrick Dodd, โthe tendency [of the legal environment] was to permit a capitalist to combine a considerable measure of control over a business with a sharing in its profits without becoming responsible for its debts.โ59 This was a setting favorable to the progress of capital-intensive technologies and the expansion of industrial infrastructure.
The politicians of the new establishment did their part to create a macroeconomic environment equally conducive to techno-nationalist development. Their chosen political vehicle was, naturally, the victorious party of Lincoln. The GOP regularly endorsed a Hamiltonian vision of Americaโs future. Because, as James Garfield put it, โthe civil society of our country is honeycombed through with disintegrating forces,โ60 the United States was in desperate need of a strong centripetal force, which is exactly how most Republicans saw industry. Benjamin Harrison articulated a common belief when he argued that the new industrial economy was โworking mightily . . . to efface all lingering estrangements between our people.โ61
For two generations, Republicans used the powers of the American state to strengthen this new national industrial order. Republican congressional majorities offered more than 120 million acresโmore than double the area of Virginiaโin land grants to transcontinental telegraph and railroad companies.62 They built a wall of tariffs to protect American manufactures, especially the producers of iron and steel.63 Republican presidents appointed friendly justices to the federal courts (in the year of the Wabash and Santa Clara County decisions, all nine justices on the U.S. Supreme Court had been appointed by Republicans).64
These presidents also maintained Americaโs commitment to the gold standard against a tidal wave of populist agitation against it. This was particularly important to industrial interests dependent on foreign investment, such as the railroads. The scale of this investment was substantial. By 1895, the value of British railway bond holdings exceeded the annual expenditure of the U.S. federal government. And there was widespread fear that foreign investors would dump American securities if the United States abandoned the gold standard for greenbacks or free silver.65 Republican statesmen had to justify this monetary status quo to a national constituency all throughout the late nineteenth century, something they did with great zeal.
The Republican Party of this era was a political alliance between the Protestant clergy and the petit bourgeois of small-town New England and New York; the prosperous farmers of the Midwest, many of whom were Union veterans; and the new Eastern Establishment.66 The policy suite enacted by the GOP benefited each of these groups. Protective tariffs not only favored the large industrialists, but also smaller manufacturers across the North. Industries like wool were given special carve-outs in order to keep their producers in the Republican column. Tariff revenues, in turn, were used to fund generous pensions to Union veterans.67 These commitments often extended beyond government policy into acts of private patronage, such as when, during a federal budget shortfall, J. P. Morgan personally lent $2.5 million to the Army payroll to ensure that the payment of veteran pensions would continue, or when George Westinghouse underwrote the national gathering of five thousand chapter leaders of the Grand Army of the Republic in his hometown.68
The magnates of the Gilded Age grasped a lesson their twenty-first-century successors have largely forgotten. Technological development is only possible when a governing coalition commits to it; potential coalition members must be courted and convinced.69
The Eastern Establishment understood its project in generational terms. They knew that the integration of the American nation and the growth of American power would not be accomplished in their lifetime. They wanted their children to inherit their select position in American societyโand to be worthy of that inheritance. These anxieties came to a head in the 1880s, as the first generation with no memory of the Civil War came of age. During this decade, New England boarding schools like St. Paulโs reinvented themselves as national preparatory academies for the sons of the industrial elite, drawing students from New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.70 In their wake came a crop of new boarding schoolsโLawrenceville (1883), Groton (1884), Hotchkiss (1892), Choate (1896), St. Georgeโs (1896), Middlesex (1901), and Kent (1906)โeach catering to a nationally defined upper class.71
Ivy League universities would follow suit. In the 1870s, Harvard instituted a standardized test for admissions that could be administered outside of Boston. By 1880, applicants were sitting for them in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and California. Alumni clubs were sprouting up in Americaโs major cities just as quickly, and the Board of Overseers soon opened to Harvard graduates living outside of Massachusetts.72 The result was a truly national institution and a reliable training ground for corporate America. On any given year between 1860 and 1900, between one-quarter and one-half of all Harvard students studied business.73
These institutions were not, and could never be, a complete replacement for the Civil War experience, though they did seek to cultivate the virtues the Civil War generation revered, such as patriotism, self-discipline, rationalism, professional competence, and physical courage.74 Just as importantly, they gave the children of a geographically dispersed elite a shared background, a common set of expectations, and enduring social bonds. Social clubs, intermarriage, and business partnerships reinforced these ties, allowing the Establishment to act with coherence and confidence long after the war had faded from living memory.
The economic, social, and political activities of the Eastern Establishment were mutually reinforcing pillars of a larger program. Members of the Establishment used the wealth generated by new technologies to secure political influence, used that influence to sustain a national market and legal framework geared for yet more technological expansion, and then presided over a conscious effort to preserve and transmit the values of their class to future generations, ensuring that the unity and discipline they gained in shared struggle would not dissipate amid power and prosperity. Through these means, a techno-nationalist elite guided Americaโs development for more than seventy years. Under its stewardship, the United States became the worldโs wealthiest, most industrially advanced, and most powerful nation: a true technological republic.
A New Techno-Nationalist Elite?
This historical review offers uncomfortable lessons for those who dream, as Alexander Karp and Nicholas Zamiska do, of a twenty-first century techno-nationalist elite. The Technological Republicโs call for a โunion of the state and the software industryโ is, at bottom, a call for a new governing class.75 Any governing class requires three things: a political coalition to which it owes allegiance and over which it exercises influence; an economic base that provides this class with wealth and unites its members around shared material interests; and finally, a set of institutions, rituals, and social customs that give this class a culture distinct from the country at large. Absent the first two, a leadership class lacks the power to lead; absent the latter two, it lacks the ability to act as a class. The Eastern Establishmentโs seventy-year dominance rested on its possession of all three.
It is not enough, therefore, to advocate for โa closer alignment of visionโ between Silicon Valley and the state without asking what economic, political, and cultural arrangements could make such an alignment possible.76 The Technological Republic suggests that the federal government could profit from Silicon Valleyโs organizational ingenuity, but it does not suggest how elected officials or federal bureaucrats might gain that expertise firsthand. It argues that technologists must identify with the American nation-state, but it never explains how this culturally progressive, immigrant-heavy industry might actually do so.
Part of Karp and Zamiskaโs problem lies in how they conceive of this task. The Technological Republic speaks of the fusion of a โsectorโ and a โstate,โ but sectors and states are abstractions; what must be fused are people. This was also true for Americaโs first techno-nationalist elite. Behind the Eastern Establishment stood a dense web of personal ties that bound its families together. Many of these ties were consummated, quite literally, on the marriage bed. Karp and Zamiska are loathe to think in these terms. They write a great deal about the engineering eliteโs waning commitment to Western civilization, but they have little to say about its waning commitment to raising the next generation of that civilization. The Eastern Establishment was self-consciously reproductive: it built schools, endowed universities, and founded literal dynasties. Part of building โa shared culture . . . that will make possible our continued survivalโ is creating the children who will survive us.77
The only concrete suggestion Karp and Zamiska offer for stopping the โmost talented minds of our generation [from] splintering off . . . from the nationโ is to restore โa core curriculum situated around the Western traditionโ in Americaโs top universities.78 To this end, an entire chapter of the Technological Republic is spent relitigating the โcanon warsโ of the 1980s. This is thin gruel. If John Calhoun lacked national feeling, it was not for want of reading Plato and Homer, nor can the public-spirited ethos of the old Eastern Establishment be chalked up to a reading list. It was first forged in total war. It was later passed on and maintained through a lifelong system of education and socialization that started with the spartan boarding schools of youth and culminated in restrictive codes of behavior that governed all adulthood. A two-semester survey of the Western canon is no substitute for a way of life.
Karp and Zamiska recognize that Silicon Valleyโs engineering elite lack the cultural confidence to defend any way of life. In a revealing passage, they lament that Americaโs technologists shy away from โthe vital yet messy questions of what constitutes a good life, which collective endeavors society should pursue, and what a shared and national identity can make possible.โ79 This fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem, however. Silicon Valleyโs failing is not that its leaders refuse to ask such questions: it is that they refuse to answer them. Here Karp and Zamiska cannot escape the disease they so confidently diagnose. They insist that โthe reconstitution of a technological republic will require a reassertion of national culture and valuesโ but never tell us what those values are.80 They lament that Silicon Valley has been swallowed by โnarrow and thin utilitarianism,โ yet they do not articulate a richer moral vision to replace it.81 There is no passage in the Technological Republic that attempts to โdefine the good lifeโ or โdescribe what a shared national identity can make possible.โ
The technologists of an earlier century were not so reticent. They spoke frankly about their understanding of duty, hierarchy, patriotism, and moral standards. They preached an ethic of service to the nation that both sustained their power and defined its use. So confident were they in their vision of American life that it not only defined the worldview of their children and grandchildren but gave those descendants the ambition to โAmericanizeโ the rest of the country, and, in time, much of the globe.
One looks in vain for such confidence in The Technological Republic. Karp and Zamiska devote entire chapters to urging the American public to tolerate corporate leaders who are strange, discomforting, or corrupt. They argue that too many of these leaders โare reluctant to venture into the discussion, to articulate genuine belief . . . for fear that they will be punished in the contemporary public sphere.โ82 There is nothing objectionable in that argument, but it is painfully procedural. When Karp and Zamiska lament that that too many โfounders say [they] actively seek out risk, but when it comes to public relations and deeper investments in more significant societal challenges, caution often prevails,โ they could be describing themselves.83 They demand a pulpit for Americaโs technologists but never summon the courage to state what gospel they should preach.
Large passages of The Technological Republic thus read as a throat clearing exercise in place of substantive content that never arrives. Karp and Zamiska correctly observe that โan overly timid engagement with the debates of our time will rob one of the ferocity of feeling that is necessary to move the world.โ84 But the book itself refuses to engage in any of the โdebates of our time.โ
To pick a timely controversy, what is the dispute over H-1B visas if not a debate over the very questions Karp says Silicon Valley must confront: โwhat is this country, what are our values, and for what do we stand?โ85 Karp abstains from staking a position in this debate, or in any of the dozens of debates that touch on technologyโs relationship to โsubstantive notions of the good or virtuous life.โ86 What is his vision for Americaโs place in the world? What principles should govern the relationship between artificial intelligence and the American polity? Does transhumanism violate or embody the โshared purpose and identityโ Karp and Zamiska believe we must forge? If what we need is a โlarger project for which to fight,โ87 then what precisely should that project be?
Americaโs first techno-nationalist elite did have such a project. Many of them died fighting for it. The industrial civilization they built would have been impossible without their ironclad commitment to Americaโs national greatness. Judged by that standard, Karp and Zamiskaโs arguments are intolerably thin. โThose who say nothing wrong,โ Karp and Zamiska warn, โoften say nothing much at all.โ88 The Technological Republic says nothing wrong and nothing much at all.
This article originally appeared in American Affairs Volume IX, Number 4 (Winter 2025): 108โ31.
Notes
The author wishes to thank โDean Marshall,โ an attorney based in Washington, D.C., for his assistance in writing this essay.
1 A fact more generally recognized and celebrated outside of America than inside it. For examples, see: Thomas Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 249โ355.
2 See: Vaclav Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century: Technical Innovations of 1867โ1914 and Their Lasting Impact (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Vaclav Smil, Transforming the Twentieth Century: Technical Innovations and Their Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
3 Nadia Asparouhova, โRewriting the California Ideology,โ American Affairs 9, no. 2 (Summer 2025): 209โ21.
4 Alexander Karp and Nicholas W. Zamiska, The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West (New York: Crown Currency, 2025), 219.
5 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 74.
6 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 107.
7 Alexander Hamilton, โAlexander Hamiltonโs Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures, [5 December 1791],โ Founders Online, National Archives, accessed October 2025; Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 10, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Yale Law SchoolโThe Avalon Project, accessed October 2025. For a longer exposition of Hamiltonโs proposed system, see: Edward Meade Earle, โAdam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power,โ in The Makers of Modern Strategy: Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 217โ65.
8 E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958), 384โ85; Peter Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 1700โ1900: Private Institutions, Elites, and the Origins of American Nationality (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 218โ19; William Freehling, The Road to Disunion, vol I: Secessionists at Bay, 1776โ1854 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), passim, but especially 9โ37.
9 The transportation and communication networks of the early republic are described in: Daniel Walker Howe, What God Hath Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815โ1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 40โ41, 212โ26.
10 Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 81โ88; John Ingham, The Iron Barons: A Social Analysis of an American Urban Elite, 1874โ1965 (Westport, Conn: Greenport Press, 1978), 22, 147. In Charleston, marriages between the stateโs lowland and piedmont planter elites were viewed as bridging two fundamentally different cultures. See: William Freehling, Prelude to the Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina 1816โ183 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 19โ24.
11 David McCullough, Mornings on Horseback: The Story of an Extraordinary Family, a Vanished Way of Life, and the Unique Child Who Became Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 199. See also comments on Princeton in: Ingham, Iron Barons, 95.
12 Christopher Grandy, โNew Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875โ1929,โ Journal of Economic History, 49, no. 3 (1989): 677โ92.
13 Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 241โ42.
14 David Hacket Fisher, Albionโs Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); E. Digby Baltzell, Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia, (1979; reissued, New York: Routledge, 2017), 57โ177.
15 Howe, What God Hath Wrought, 136โ37.
16 Howe, What God Hath Wrought, 164โ203; Baltzell, Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia, 364โ66; Robert Swierenga, โEthnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Voting, Values, Cultures,โ in Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the Present, eds. Mark Noll and Luke E. Harlow (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 144โ68.
17 For a prominent example, see: Daniel Webster, The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Constitution: Selected Documents, ed. Herman Belz (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000).
18 The Jacksonian party system reinforced the localist tendencies of Jacksonian ideology. Leaders of the Whig and Democratic parties were localists by necessity, not national organizations but loose networks of local political machines. Through the 1880s, national party committees were weak or nonexistent. National leaders were chosen through pyramidal nominating conventions, which empowered local bosses. The spoils system, rooted in geography, handed patronage to congressmen and party bosses rather than the president, further entrenching parochial interests. In the words of historian Daniel Klinghard, the system was โdesigned to empower the preferences of state and local organizationsโ over the concerns of the national electorate.
See: Daniel Klinghard, The Nationalization of American Political Parties, 1880โ1896 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25โ66, 191โ235. Here, as elsewhere, this would change when leaders of the Eastern Establishment built a new set of national institutions at the tail end of the Gilded Age.
19 Howe, What God Hath Wrought, 221โ22; Freehling, Prelude to the Civil War, 98โ9, 118, 256.
20 As quoted in: Lawrence Frederik Kohl, The Politics of Individualism: Parties and the American Character in the Jacksonian Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 28, 141; James M. McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 99.
21 Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850โ1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 20โ97, especially 60โ64, 87โ88.
22 Noam Maggor, Brahmin Capitalism: Frontiers of Wealth and Populism in Americaโs First Gilded Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 22, 26โ30, 34โ35, 50.
23 Quoted in: Kohl, Politics of Individualism, 138.
24 On the consolidation of the Northern regional elites during and immediately after the war, see: Hall, Organization of American Culture, 275โ89; on the industrial elite, see: Beckert, The Monied Metropolis, 115โ32, 135โ37, 148โ58.
25 Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859โ1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 233โ34, 416โ20. Their allies in the Northern textile mills and New York merchant houses were likewise forced either to anchor their fortunes elsewhere or sink into decline. See: Maggor, Brahmin Capitalism, 8โ10; Beckert, Monied Metropolis, 120โ21, 151โ54, 164โ71.
26 Leonard P. Curry, Blueprint for Modern America: Nonmilitary Legislation of the First Civil War Congress (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968).
27 Kessner, Capital City: New York City and the Men Behind Americaโs Rise to Dominance (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 36โ43; Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War, 1863โ1864 (New York: Scribner, 1971), 249โ57; Beckert, The Monied Metropolis, 136โ37.
28 Long after becoming one of the most successful bankers on Wall Street and an adviser to several Republican governments, Henry Clews remembered his participation in Union War financing as the most significant accomplishment of his career. He would memorialize his professionโs participation in war financing with the following words: โThere was patriotism worthy of Patrick Henry, as well as profit, in this. . . . As General Grant said long afterwards to me, we were not fighting for the Union as soldiers in the field, but we served it equally well by helping it in its struggle for money to prosecute the war; and I felt proud of the active part I took in thus helping to preserve the Union as one of its army in civilian life.โ See: Henry Clews, Fifty Years in Wall Street: โTwenty-Eight Years in Wall Street,โ Revised and Enlarged by a Rรฉsumรฉ of the Past Twenty-two Years, Making a Record of Fifty Years in Wall Street (New York: Irving Publishing, 1908), xliiโxliii, 91.
29 He was not entirely successful; in Vincent Carrosso and Rose Carassoโs judgement, Morganโs activities brought his firm โadded recognition and the satisfaction of contributing to the Treasuryโs efforts to reorganize the debtโ but did not result in profits. See: Vincent Carrosso and Rose Carasso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers, 1854โ1913 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 94โ114
30 Beckert, Monied Metropolis, 150.
31 Rockefeller was not yet the oil magnate he would soon become, but a prosperous shipper of dry goods. See: Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John Rockerfeller, Sr., 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 2004), 87.
32 Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, 345.
33 In both cases, the Union League Club did this in conjunction with other associations: the Loyal Publication League and Loyal League of Union Citizens, for the first; the New York Association for Promoting Colored Volunteering, for the second. The membership of these organizations drew from an overlapping set of wealthy activists in which manufacturing magnates like Peter Cooper dominated. See: Beckert, Monied Metropolis, 131, 134โ35.
34 Beckert, Monied Metropolis, 116. The committee was initially funded solely by donations from wealthy New Yorkers and the New York Chamber of Commerce; by the end of the war, it would also draw from the New York City municipal budget.
35 Allan Nevins, The Organized War, 1863โ1864, 317โ23; on the class background of the Commissionsโ leaders, see: George Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union, rev. ed (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 99-100.
36 Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 67.
37 Hall, Organization of American Culture, 270โ71.
38 Hall, Organization of American Culture, 270.
39 Frederickson, Inner Civil War, viii, 173โ76. On the question of the railroad influence on Army organizational practice, see: Hall, Organization of American Culture, 280โ87; on the impact military service had on late nineteenth century corporate culture, see: Nevins, The Organized War, 1863โ1864, 329โ30.
40 This generational conflict in ideals is explored in: Frederickson, Inner Civil War, passim, but especially 173โ76; Menand, The Metaphysical Club, 3โ69.
41 William H. Seward, The Works of William H. Seward, Vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1884), 384.
42 Henry Clews, Fifty Years in Wall Street, 6. This generational turnover in financial and industrial circles during the 1860s is also emphasized in: Maggor, Brahmin Capitalism, 36โ40; Beckert, Monied Metropolis, 123.
43 Michael Allsep Jr., โNew Forms for Dominance: How a Corporate Lawyer Created the American Military Establishment,โ PhD diss. (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008), 129.
44 Senator John Sherman described their vision as such: โThe truth is, the close of the war with our resource unimpaired gives an elevation, a scope to the ideas of leading capitalists, far higher than anything ever undertaken in this country before. They talk of millions as confidently as formerly of thousandsโฆ our manufacturers are yet in their infancy, but soon I expect to see, under the stimulus of great demand and the protection of our tariff, locomotive and machine shops worthy of the name.โ Quoted in: Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War to Victory, 1863โ1864 (New York: Scribner, 1971), 373.
45 Maggor, Boston Brahmins, 9.
46 Kessner, Capital City, 46โ7; Beckert, The Monied Metropolis, 145.
47 Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 295.
48 James Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 219โ91.
49 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), passim, but especially 81โ122; 145โ188. See also: Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 1โ2, 12โ13, 65โ71; Bensel, Political Economy, 314โ18.
50 Kessner, Capital City, 285โ335; Chandler, Visible Hand, 315โ44.
51 Kessner, Capital City, 298.
52 Between 1789 and 1865, for example, Connecticut passed something like three thousand special acts incorporating every conceivable kind of social and economic organization. See: William J. Novak, โPutting the โPublicโ in Public Administration: The Rise of the Public Utility Idea,โ in Administrative Law from the Inside out: Essays on Themes in the Work of Jerry L. Mashaw, ed. Nicholas R. Parrillo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 373โ97.
53 E. Merrick Dodd Jr., โAmerican Business Association Law a Hundred Years Ago and Today,โ in Law: A Century of Progress 1835-1935, Vol. 1, ed. Alison Reppy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), 254โ84; Grandy, โNew Jersey Corporate Chartermongering.โ
54 Quoted in: Bensel, Political Economy, 327; this passage draws in his broader discussion from 321โ54. See also: Berk, Alternative Tracks, 58โ60, 156โ58.
55 Bensel, Political Economy, 336.
56 Quoted in: Tony Freyer, โThe Federal Courts, Localism, and the National Economy, 1865โ1900,โ Business History Review 53, no. 3 (Autumn, 1979):
359โ60.
57 Consider, for example, Justice Samuel Millerโs decision in Cook v. Pennsylvania (1878), striking down a Pennsylvania law that taxed the sale of out-of-state goods sold at auction, which reads in part: โIf certain states could exercise the unlimited power of taxing all the merchandise which passes from the port of New York through those states to the consumers in the great west, or could taxโas has been done until recentlyโevery person who sought the seaboard through the railroads within their jurisdiction, the constitution would have failed to effect one of the most important purposes for which it was adopted.โ Quoted in: Bensel, Political Economy, 325.
58 Berk, Alternate Tracks, 65.
59 Dodd, โAmerican Business Association Law,โ 258.
60 Quoted in: John Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 1828โ1996 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 99.
61 Benjamin Harrison, Speeches of Benjamin Harrison, Twenty Third President of the United States (New York: United States Book Company, 1892), 142. See also James G. Blaineโs comments about the โspirit of industrial enterpriseโ and the โunification of financial interestsโ in: James G. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, (Norwich, Conn.: Henry Bill Publishing, 1884), 671.
62 This was accompanied by loans for $16,000 per mile (for construction on the plains) and $48,000 per mile (in the mountains) of government bonds to the Central Pacific and Union Pacific Railroads. See: H. W. Brands, American Colossus (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2011), 49.
63 Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization, 8โ18, 205โ88, 457โ509.
64 Moreover, seven of these were from the Northeast. See: Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization, 344โ55. Railroad executive Charles Elliot Perkins thought that this was the most important role of the GOP. As he wrote in one letter, โThere are so many jack-asses about nowadays who think property has no rights, that the filling of the Supreme Court vacancies is the most important function of the presidential office,โ See: Freyer, โThe Federal Courts, Localism, and the National Economy,โ 346.
65 Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization, 355โ456.
66 On the origins of this coalition, see Richard Cawardineโs account of the election of 1864 in: Richard Cawardine, Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2007), 249โ310. Also see: Phillip Shaw Paludan, โWar Is the Health of the Party: Republicans in the American Civil War,โ in The Birth of the Old Grand Party, eds. Robert F. Engs and Randall M. Miller (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 60โ81. On the maintenance of this coalition through the Gilded Age, see: Bensel, Political Economy, 130, 490โ5, 502โ6; Robert Marcus, Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age, 1880โ1896 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
67 Bensel, Political Economy, 487โ502.
68 Kessner, Capital City, 217โ218; William Huber, George Westinghouse: Powering the World (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2022), 223โ24.
69 The leaders of nineteenth century industry did not just seek to materially reward coalition members but also built institutions to persuade coalition members of the value of favored policies. Consider the example of the American Iron and Steel Association, the million tracts it distributed in the run-up to the election of 1888 and the network of โquestion clubsโ it founded across American towns devoted to debating tariff policy. See: Klinghard, The Nationalization of American Political Parties, 76โ81.
70 Ingham, The Iron Barons, 93โ94, 148, 217; Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentleman, 307โ12.
71 Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentleman, 306.
72 Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 321โ22. Similar reforms occurred across the Ivy League
73 Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 289.
74 Jerome Karabell, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Princeton, and Yale (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 27โ38.
75 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 27.
76 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 53โ54.
77 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 243.
78 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 154, 106โ7.
79 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 14โ15.
80 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 31.
81 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 53โ54.
82 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 17.
83 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 69.
84 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 64.
85 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 95.
86 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 231.
87 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 250, 96.
88 Karp and Zamiska, The Technological Republic, 85.
About the Author
Tanner Greer is a writer and deputy director of the Open Source Observatory at the Council of Foreign Relations.

แต the agora. Athens, southern Europe/ eastern Mediterranean Sea region, circa 400 years before the Common-era













